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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I study the international transmission of shocks when assets traded across 
borders are differently suitable as collateral for borrowing (i.e., pledgeability). Under 
financial integration, differences in pledgeability have implications for the demand for 
assets. For instance, if a shock makes it more difficult to pledge the assets of the 
country receiving the shock, agents expect these assets to yield a relatively higher 
premium than foreign assets in the near future. I develop an approach to determine the 
optimal portfolio allocations, as existing methods cannot be directly applied to capture 
differences in asset pledgeability. In this case of heterogeneously pledgeable assets, 
financial shocks are transmitted from one country to another because the same asset is 
held by residents of different countries. Valuation effects arise as a consequence of the 
reaction of asset returns in different countries. In contrast, a standard model cannot 
generate any of these implications when assets have the same degree of pledgeability. 
Indeed, when assets have the same degree of pledgeability, financial shocks are 
country-specific and hinder the access to credit only for the residents of the country hit 
by the shock. 
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country to another because the same asset is held by residents of different countries. Valu-
ation effects arise as a consequence of the reaction of asset returns in different countries. In
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the global dimension of frictions in credit markets, with
borrowing constraints playing an important role because investors take advantage of international
market integration and purchase securities of different countries. These cross-border positions
form the total wealth of investors, and this wealth is simultaneously the collateral to pledge as a
guarantee for the loans available in the credit market. This internationally diversified collateral
is a channel for the transmission of shocks from one country to another (Devereux and Yetman,
2010)1. This transmission mechanism has been at work during the financial debacle started in the
US in 2007. In the first stage of the crisis, borrowing constraints tightened worldwide, because
European banks had invested in the U.S. and U.S. agents had purchased assets in Europe.
In examining this mechanism, the literature so far has not looked into the possibility that
investors of a given country can borrow more or less against local collateral assets than against
foreign assets. Specifically, the standard assumption is that assets of different countries constitute
a unique collateral (i.e., have the same degree of pledgeability). It follows that a country-specific
real shock drives a wedge between the relative return on local versus foreign assets, but the fact
that there is no difference in the way investors can use all of these assets as collateral remains
unaltered. Most importantly, also financial shocks are country-specific, as they reduce the access
to the credit market for all of the investors of a given country regardless of the assets that
they pledge for borrowing. This is an important case, but it is arguably not so appropriate for
understanding situations like the one observed at the onset of the recent crisis, when European
banks could not borrow pledging assets connected with the U.S. housing sector.
In this paper, I introduce asset-specific pledgeability, so that - under idiosyncratic shocks -
assets display different degrees of pledgeability across the border. Two are the contributions of
this analysis. First, I develop an approach for the solution of the international portfolios under
heterogeneous pledgeability. This approach extends the methods developed by Devereux and
Sutherland (2011a) and Tille and Van Wincoop (2010), which are otherwise not directly applica-
ble to the case I analyze. Second, I study the international transmission of asset-specific financial
shocks as opposed to the transmission of country-specific financial shocks. Understanding the
different mechanisms is nowadays crucial, since productivity shocks fall short of fully explaining
gross financial flows in times of distress (Broner, Didier, Erce and Schmukler, 2013).
There is ample evidence that lenders may have a preference for some collateral assets as op-
posed to other alternatives. For example, in 2008-2009 it was easier for borrowers to obtain funds
1See also Dedola and Lombardo (2012), Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) and Trani (2012)
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pledging non-subprime bonds than pledging subprime securities (Gorton and Metrick, 2010)2.
Garleanu and Pedersen (2012) show that differences in asset liquidity can justify price-differences
between assets that otherwise yield the same income stream as well as between investment-grade
and high-yield bonds.
This paper analyzes how these types of differences in the pledgeability of assets can improve
our understanding of the interlinkages between financially integrated countries. For example,
BEA data show that in recent years the financial flows between the U.S. and the rest of the
world were markedly influenced by the change in the quality of U.S. private securities. In 2003-
2007, there had been a massive increase in the external demand for the debt securities issued
by the U.S. private sector, including asset-backed securities. According to BEA data (Gohrband
and Howell, 2010), the investment in private debt had increased by 19%, which is bigger than
the 16% average increase in the net purchase of all types of U.S. assets for those four years3.
But after 2007, previously good U.S. private assets lost their rating, affecting negatively the U.S.
capital inflows. In fact, over the short-run the international investment positions of countries is
strongly affected by flows involving private assets. Figure 1 decomposes the net foreign assets of
the U.S. in the net position in private assets and the net position in Treasury securities. While
the latter are persistently safe and explain the downward trend, the volatility of the overall net
foreign assets is to be attributed to private assets.
Thus, using a two-country model with endogenous portfolio choice and borrowing constraints,
I let the pledgeability of assets from each country to react to productivity and financial shocks
in that country. The rest of the model is fully in line with previous studies, which can improve
comparability. The goal is to study the implications of the new assumption for the international
transmission of shocks and put forth an approach to solve the model numerically.
I develop a solution strategy because the endogenous portfolio choice is not straightforward
to solve once the assumption that assets have the same pledgeability is relaxed. My approach
is based on the fact that the heterogeneous degree of asset pledgeability generates an expected
return differential between local and foreign assets. And to use this mechanism for determining
the country portfolios, I take advantage of the fact that credit spreads tend to be equalized across
countries when markets are integrated4.
Specifically, the mechanism works as follows. A shock in one country implies that foreign
assets constitute a relatively safer collateral in this contingency. In turn, investors formulate
expectations that they will earn relatively higher returns on the assets of the country hit by
2This is shown in Figure 2 of Gorton and Metrick’s article. See also their Figures 3-4.
3See also Bertaut and Pounder (2009).
4See Dedola and Lombardo (2012).
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the shock. In other words, these assets must pay a relatively higher equity premium to induce
investors of any country to hold them in equilibrium.
To facilitate the interpretation of the resulting portfolio positions, I study how differences in
the degree of asset pledgeability modify the incentive to diversify risk across borders. I find that
investors allocate their wealth among international assets taking into account the combined effect
of asset returns and asset pledgeability. Home bias, a well-known empirical regularity5, tends to
be slightly lower under heterogeneous pledgeability than in the standard case of homogeneous
asset pledgeability. The slight decrease in home bias shows that agents are concerned about
the fact that domestic assets can lose their pledgeability when also domestic consumption is
low. Similar concerns cannot arise when assets have the same degree of pledgeability; there is
no difference in the way local and foreign assets can be pledged as collateral. Actually, in the
framework used as the benchmark this result is even stronger, since the financial frictions do not
affect portfolio choice at all6.
Also the international transmission of financial shocks changes remarkably with the type of
model considered. When assets have different degree of pledgeability, financial shocks are asset-
specific. A shock of this type restrains borrowing because it lowers the pledgeability of the assets
of the country that receives the shock. The assets of this country are part of the portfolios of local
and foreign investors, so the shock affects all investors at the same time. This leads to valuation
effects, which are justified by the expected impact of changes in actual asset pledgeability on
future asset returns across borders. In contrast, in models with homogeneously pledgeable assets
financial shocks are country-specific. The investors of the country hit by such a shock lose access
to the credit market, but foreign investors can continue to borrow. The shock is transmitted
across borders inasmuch as those investors subject to the shock have positions in both local and
foreign financial markets. And importantly, when assets have the same degree of pledgeability,
the model cannot generate valuation effects.
I focus on short-run differences in the relative safety of collateral assets and short-run return
differentials across countries. Therefore, my analysis does not extend to the relevant question of
global imbalances, whose origins are to some extent connected with the idea examined here. The
5In the light of the home equity bias commonly observed in the data, I interpret my results looking at the
share of local assets in total portfolios. Since the analysis here is not about reproducing home bias endogenously
(which has been addressed by other studies), I generate home bias exogenously with a technique well-established
in the literature.
6It may be possible to build alternative models where borrowing constraints affect asset allocation to some
extent. Note however that only in models with heterogeneous pledgeability agents face a trade-off between the
safety of collateral assets from one country and that of collateral from other countries, and this trade-off has
implications for future asset returns and risk premiums.
4
literature points out that these imbalances are caused by the heterogeneity between financial sec-
tors across countries7. My only contribution in this regard is to show that introducing structural
differences in asset pledgeability and in the return on assets across different countries requires
a more challenging solution method for international portfolios. In addition, one should more
carefully think about the key mechanism. There is evidence that cross-border return differentials
are short-run phenomena as in the present paper (Curcuru, Thomas and Warnock, 2012), while
the global imbalances are more properly due to a “composition puzzle”, with the U.S. being long
in risky assets and short in inherently riskless assets (Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull, 2009)8.
This paper continues with a brief literature review (section 2) and a brief description of the
model (section 3). In section 4, I analyze the equity premiums of pledgeable traded assets.
Section 5 is then devoted to the analysis of endogenous portfolios and describes the solution
strategy. A numerical application of this approach is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
the paper. There is an appendix at the bottom of the paper and a separate one for further
details.
2 Literature
This paper is clearly connected with the literature on the determination of international portfolios
in open economy macro-models: Devereux and Saito (2006), Devereux and Sutherland (2011a),
Evans and Hnatkovska (2011), Pavlova and Rigobon (2010) and Tille and Van Wincoop (2010).
In these models, the return on home and foreign assets is generally symmetric, and this symmetry
is a condition for studying the equilibrium portfolios. In contrast, my analysis is based on an
asymmetry between asset returns across countries. This asymmetry is the consequence of the
different degree of pledgeability between assets. My work is mostly connected with Devereux
and Sutherland (2011a) and Tille and Van Wincoop (2010).
The model I use is the one proposed by Devereux and Yetman (2010), in which I introduce
a different degree of pledgeability between assets. The model is suitable for understanding
the international transmission of shocks under borrowing constraints. Studies that use similar
frameworks are those of Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) and Trani (2012). The novel aspect
7For instance, the global imbalances observed in the data have been justified as the consequence of a superior
ability of the U.S. to produce safe assets (Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas, 2008) or, alternatively, as the result
of the successful development of the U.S. financial system relatively to the financial system of other countries
(Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull, 2009).
8On this, see also Curcuru, Dvorak and Warnock (2008). As for the first important contributions on the
theme, see Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005).
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here is that assets contribute differently to the tightness of the borrowing constraints because
they are differently pledgeable as collateral due to real and financial factors. The different degree
of pledgeability is modeled building on a brief argument made by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999)
in their paper on the volatility of asset prices under financial frictions.
Two papers that focus especially on the transmission of financial shocks are Perri and Quadrini
(2012) and Dedola and Lombardo (2012). Perri and Quadrini (2012), showing that financial
disturbances are endogenously global, propose a theory on the synchronization of business cycles.
Financial shocks produce high cross-country correlation in my model as well. With respect to
the studies mentioned so far, Dedola and Lombardo (2012) do not model financial accelerator
effects with borrowing constraints but with monitoring costs. These costs generate credit spreads,
which tend to be equalized across countries through the process of financial integration. I use
this property of integrated markets to solve the portfolio choice problem.
For modeling the financial shocks, I refer to the work of Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Here,
financial shocks are shocks to the pledgeability of a given asset traded in international markets.
The interpretation of these shocks is more in line with recent financial literature. The idea is
that agents who lend to leveraged borrowers look closely at the quality of any collateral asset
in a given state of the economy, adjusting the size of the loan in this sense (Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009, and Gorton and Metrick, 2010). Based on similar observations, Garleanu and
Pedersen (2012) amend the CAPM with differences in margin requirements between different
types of assets. There is a clear connection with the differences in asset pledgeability. But while
I focus on international portfolio choice and transmission of shocks, their interesting contribution
is important for capturing how an asset can outperform other assets in a financial, closed-economy
setup.
Finally, international macro-models that focus on the quality of financial assets are Cao and
Gete (2011) and Blengini (2011). Both have a different goal than mine. The first is not a portfolio
model and studies long-run effects of inherently safe assets (i.e., U.S. Treasuries). The second is
an international portfolio model, which addresses the question of rebalancing under uncertainty
shocks.
3 Model
The model used is the one developed by Devereux and Yetman (2010). In this section I sketch
the main blocks of their framework as well as the main modifications I introduce, remanding the
interested reader to their original work.
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Consider a two-county model. Each country is populated by two types of agents and produce
a single good which is internationally traded. One class of agents are the investors, with overall
size equal to n; the other category of agents is represented by the savers, with overall size 1− n.
Investors have the skills to trade in international markets and select the composition of their
equity portfolio choosing between home stocks and foreign stocks. Stocks are shares on the fixed
capital used by production firms. There are only consumption good firms in the model.
Investors pledge their equity holdings as collateral to borrow from savers. This leveraged
investment strategy is modeled assuming that investors are more impatient consumers than
savers. The markets for credit is unique for both countries.
The two economies are perfectly symmetric, except for the different degree of pledgeability
of their equities.
3.1 Investors
Investors in the home country work for a fixed amount of hours at the real wage wt and purchase
home and foreign equities. For this purpose, in addition to their own savings, they can borrow
selling a riskless bond. Labour hours are normalized to one, and the objective of investors is to
maximize their utility in order to satisfy budget and collateral constraints:
max
{cIt ,bIt ,kIit}i=H,F
U I0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
ϑItu
(
cIt
)
s.t. cIt − bIt + qeHtkIHt + qeF tkIF t = wt −Rt−1bIt−1 + (qeHt + dHt) kIHt−1 + (qeF t + dFt) kIF t−1 (1)
bIt ≤ κHtqeHtkIHt + κFtqeF tkIF t (2)
where ϑIt+1 = β
(
CIt
)
ϑIt , denotes the discount factor, which depends endogenously on the average
consumption across investors, CIt . The other variables are: the bond traded on the global debt
market, bIt ; the riskless rate of interest on this debt, Rt; the purchased quantity of home and
foreign equities, kIHt and k
I
F t. Equity i = H,F trades on the market at price q
e
it and pays the
dividend dit. Pledging home equities as collateral, investors can borrow a fraction κHt < 1 of their
holdings of these securities at market value. Pledging foreign equity they can instead borrow a
fraction κFt < 1 of their holdings.
The efficiency conditions of this dynamic problem are
λIt − µt = β
(
cIt
)
Etλ
I
t+1Rt (3)
λIt − µtκHt = β
(
cIt
)
Etλ
I
t+1rHt+1 (4)
λIt − µtκFt = β
(
cIt
)
Etλ
I
t+1rFt+1 (5)
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where rit = (q
e
it + dit) /q
e
it−1 is the rate of return on equity i = H,F , λ
I
t = u
′ (cIt ) and µt is the
marginal value of borrowing against collateral.
Foreign investors have similar preferences and face a similar problem as home investors. In
this case, variables are denoted by a “star” (λ∗It = u
′ (c∗It ) is their marginal utility of consumption,
and µ∗t the shadow value of their leveraged borrowing). The collateral constraints that foreign
investors face is
b∗It ≤ κHtqeHtk∗IHt + κFtqeF tk∗IF t (6)
Borrowing constraints. The specification of the collateral constraints is the main departure
from the original model of Devereux and Yetman (2010). Equations (2) and (6) show that lenders
regard home and foreign equities as possibly heterogeneous collateral assets. In other words, any
asset i = h, F has a specific pledgeability κit for all of the investors that own that asset.
The alternative assumption, the one that has been generally used in the literature, is that
investors can pledge all of their assets in the same way. Home and foreign equities have a
common degree of pledgeability, and only the total wealth of each investor matters. The financial
constraints can differ across countries solely when lenders are more or less willing to finance
investors in the home country than to finance foreign investors:
bIt ≤ κt
(
qeHtk
I
Ht + q
e
F tk
I
F t
)
b∗It ≤ κ∗t
(
qeHtk
∗I
Ht + q
e
F tk
∗I
F t
)
(7)
where κt and κ
∗
t vary over time and are agent-specific
9. If we abstract from these cross-country
differences in borrowing constraints or the synchronization studied by Perri and Quadrini (2012)
applies, then there is a unique κt for all the agents trading in international capital markets:
bIt ≤ κt
(
qeHtk
I
Ht + q
e
F tk
I
F t
)
b∗It ≤ κt
(
qeHtk
∗I
Ht + q
e
F tk
∗I
F t
)
(8)
Table 1 summarizes the alternative assumptions that one can make. I shall compare the
features and implications of these alternatives throughout the paper.
3.2 Savers
Savers in the home country have a lower propensity to consume than investors: β
(
CSt
)
>
β
(
CIt
)
. They are willing to sacrifice their consumption and purchase the bonds sold by investors.
Similarly to investors, savers work inelastically in the domestic firms, earning the real wage wt.
In addition, savers run their own production using a fraction of the domestic capital as factor of
9See, for example, Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) and Trani (2012).
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production. But they do not have access to foreign capital, and their product is not sold in any
good market10. Their dynamic programming problem is as follows:
max
{cSt ,bSt ,kSHt}
US0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
ϑSt u
(
cSt
)
s.t. cSt + q
e
Ht
(
kSHt − kSHt−1
)− bSt = wt + z (kSHt−1)ν −Rt−1bSt−1 (9)
where ϑSt+1 = β
(
CSt
)
ϑSt denotes the endogenous discount factor and k
S
Ht is the quantity of the
domestic capital stock that savers use to run their “backyard” production. Their production
technology is z
(
kSHt−1
)ν
, with ν < 1.
Foreign investors have similar preferences and face a similar problem as home savers. So
the demand for bonds of home savers and that of foreign savers satisfy the following fist order
conditions:
λSt = β
(
cSt
)
Etλ
S
t+1Rt λ
∗S
t = β
(
c∗St
)
Etλ
∗S
t+1Rt (10)
where λSt = u
′ (cSt ). These conditions imply perfect risk-sharing between savers of different
countries.
3.3 Production
Home firms produce a homogeneous good which is traded across countries using a standard, con-
cave production function: YHt = AtF (KHt−1). Home productivity, At, is a stationary stochastic
process, and KHt is the stock of capital purchased by firms. Firms finance their productive
capital issuing equities that are sold to home and foreign investors, so KHt = nχHt. The vari-
able χHt = k
I
Ht + k
∗I
Ht is the total amount of outstanding shares normalized by the number of
shareholders.
Firms are competitive, so dividends on their stocks are dHt = AtF
′ (KHt−1), and the wage
rate they pay is wt = YHt − AtF ′ (KHt−1)KHt−1.
Foreign firms produce and maximize profits in the same way as home firms. Their produc-
tive capital is KFt = nχFt, and the marginal product of this capital is the dividend dFt =
A∗tF
′ (KFt−1).
10Together with that on discount factors, the assumption that savers use domestic capital to produce a non-
traded good distinguishes the economic role of these agents from that of investors. Savers demand domestic
capital just for their own use: they are neither leveraged nor expert enough to trade stocks in international
markets. Nonetheless, their demand for domestic capital is useful to determine the total amount of capital stock
in the steady state. See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Devereux and Yetman (2010).
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3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
The clearing conditions for the good, bond, and capital markets are, respectively, as follows:
n
(
cIt + c
∗I
t
)
+ (1− n) (cSt + c∗St ) = YHt + YFt + (1− n) [z (kSHt−1)ν + z (k∗SFt−1)ν] (11)
n
(
bIt + b
∗I
t
)
+ (1− n) (bSt + b∗St ) = 0 (12)
nχit + (1− n) kSit = 1, for i = H,F (13)
On each date t = 0, ...,∞, the competitive equilibrium is a vector of allocations (cIt , c∗It ,
cSt , c
∗S
t , b
I
t , b
∗I
t , b
S
t , b
∗S
t , k
I
Ht, k
∗I
Ht, k
S
Ht, k
I
F t, k
∗I
F t, k
∗S
Ft) and a vector of prices (Rt, q
e
Ht, q
e
F t, wt,
w∗t , dHt, dFt) such that: (a) the representative investor maximizes her lifetime utility subject to
the budget and collateral constraints; (b) the representative saver maximizes her lifetime utility
subject to the budget constraint; (c) firms purchase capital in order to maximize profits; (d) all
markets clear.
4 Pledgeability and Equity Premiums
According to the demand functions, investors purchase asset i = H,F for two reasons. One
reason is the expected return on that asset, rit+1. The other is the possibility to pledge the asset
in order to borrow a fraction κit of its value from savers. So a difference between the pledgeability
of home versus foreign equities translates into a return differential, with opposite sign.
In fact, a simple combination of equations (4)-(5) yields
κHt
κFt
=
1− EtΛIt,t+1rHt+1
1− EtΛIt,t+1rFt+1
(14)
where ΛIt,t+1 = β
(
cIt
)
λIt+1/λ
I
t is the stochastic discount factor of home investors. Revising the
argument made by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), the interpretation of this relation is that assets
with higher degree of pledgeability are expected to pay lower returns in the future. Assume
for instance that, at time t, savers prefer to lend against foreign equities as opposed to home
equities: κHt/κFt < 1. In this sense, foreign equities are relatively safer than home equities. In
comparison to foreign firms, home firms need to promise higher returns in order to compensate
investors for purchasing their stocks, which are temporarily not so useful as collateral. This is
reflected in investors’ expectations about future returns, so EtΛ
I
t,t+1rHt+1 > EtΛ
I
t,t+1rFt+1.
In this example, foreign equities represent reliable assets for leveraged investors. With respect
to home assets, foreign equities “relax” the borrowing constraints because their pledgeability as
collateral is superior in periods of bad economic conditions. This sort of hedging property is
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per se an important motive for investing in foreign equities, which is alternative to the incentive
given by the future payoff on these assets.
Equations (3)-(5) imply that the risk premium on any equity i = H,F is
Etrit+1 −Rt = %it + µt
β (cIt )Etλ
I
t+1
(1− κit) (15)
where the first component of the risk premium is the standard comovement between the stochastic
discount factor and the return on equity:
%it ≡ −
covt
(
ΛIt,t+1, rit+1
)
EtΛIt,t+1
For future reference, I conveniently denote the equity premium defined in equation (15) as EPit ≡
Etrit+1 − Rt+1. Equation (15) shows that the risk premium of asset i does not only depend on
how its rate of return comoves with the stochastic discount factor of investors, which is captured
by %it. The premium is also affected by the tightness of the borrowing constraint, in general,
and the pledgeability of asset i, in particular. The effect of the borrowing constraint is measured
by µt/
[
β
(
cIt
)
Etλ
I
t+1
]
. This is the spread that investors must pay to borrow and guarantee a
risk-free return to savers. That is, the spread is a consequence of the fact that constraints bind
in equilibrium. The specific effect of the pledgeability of asset i is given by the term 1− κit. In
periods in which κit is low, this term is high and asset i must pay a high equity premium
11.
On the cross-sectional dimension, the different degree of pledgeability between assets of dif-
ferent countries imply an expected return differential. This differential is reflected in the relative
risk premium of home versus foreign equities, which is
EPHt − EPFt = %Ht − %Ft − µt
β (cIt )Etλ
I
t+1
(κHt − κFt) (16)
This equation shows that, other things being equal, the relative equity premium of home versus
foreign equities is high if κHt < κFt. The reverse is instead true when κHt > κFt, in which case
EPHt − EPFt could in principle be even negative. The same line of reasoning applies to foreign
investors as well.
In contrast, this is not true for any investors when assets have the same degree of pledgeability.
If the form of the borrowing constraints is that of equation (7), then investors’ demand functions
11For a related argument, see Garleanu and Pedersen (2011). They discuss extensively the effect of differences
in the use of assets as collateral on rates of return. Their main point is that these differences can be used as a
measure of relative performance, which allows to distinguish one security from anyone else. They show that these
differences can even explain why in some periods the law of one price may fail to apply.
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imply that the equity premiums on any asset i are
EPit = %it +
µt
β (cIt )Etλ
I
t+1
(1− κt) EP ∗it = %∗it +
µ∗t
β (c∗It )Etλ∗It+1
(1− κ∗t )
And if the borrowing constraints are those of equation (8), the equity premiums are
EPit = %it +
µt
β (cIt )Etλ
I
t+1
(1− κt) EP ∗it = %∗it +
µ∗t
β (c∗It )Etλ∗It+1
(1− κt)
In either of these two cases, assets are equally pledgeable and the relative premiums of home
versus foreign equities are simply
EPHt − EPFt = %Ht − %Ft EP ∗Ht − EP ∗Ft = %∗Ht − %∗Ft (17)
Investors of different countries may face different constraints, but for anyone of them the choice
between home and foreign equities is the same as if they were unconstrained investors. Indeed,
(17) is a standard case in International Macroeconomics: relative equity premiums of this sort
are present even in models that do not involve credit market frictions.
5 Portfolio Choice
Equations (4)-(5) govern the portfolio choice of investors in the home country, who buy stocks of
local firms and of foreign firms. Similar relations govern the portfolio choice of foreign investors.
The two main methods that are available for solving this portfolio choice problem have been
developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2011a) and Tille and Van Wincoop (2010). In what
follows I shall draw from both methods, referring to the first as DS and to the second as TvW.
Each of them has some useful elements for my purpose. In addition, the main properties of the
two methods are essentially equivalent, so referring to both of them is straightforward.
The approximated relations presented below are written specifying the order of approxima-
tions as suggested by TvW12. The zero order component of a variable (e.g., Z (0)) denotes the
steady state value of that variable. The first order component (e.g., Z (1)) corresponds to the
approximated variable of a standard linearization around the steady state. And so on. However,
the most of the derivations are detailed in the separate appendix.
12In general, any variable can be written as the sum of its order components: for example, Zt = Zt (0)+Zt (1)+
Zt (2) + ...
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5.1 External Wealth and Borrowing Constraints
Following DS, the model can be rewritten in such a way that the effect of portfolio choice on
the buildup of wealth over time becomes explicit. As usual, this effect is captured by the budget
constraint of investors, and - for the properties of general equilibrium - it is sufficient to consider
the budget constraint of agents in the home country. This constraint (equation (1)) is rewritten
as follows:
cIt +NFEt = wt + dHtχHt−1 − qeHt (χHt − χHt−1) + bIt −Rt−1bIt−1
+ (rHt − rFt)ωt−1 + rFtNFEt−1 (18)
where NFEt = q
e
F tk
I
F t − qeHt
(
χHt − kIHt
)
are the net foreign equities of the home country and
ωt = q
e
Ht
(
kIHt − χHt
)
is the portfolio share. This share is the negative of foreign investors’ holdings
of home equities, so the ownership of the home capital stock is internationally diversified if ωt < 0.
The net foreign equities of the foreign country can be simply derived from the equilibrium in the
global economy: NFEt +NFE
∗
t = 0.
The external wealth of investors affect also the tightness of the constraints limiting their
borrowing. However, the ultimate effect depends on whether assets are equally pledgeable or
differently pledgeable.
Claim 1 The portfolio position of a country affects the borrowing constraints of its residents
only when traded assets display different degree of pledgeability.
If home and foreign equities are homogeneously pledgeable, the relevant borrowing constraints
are (7)-(8). The constraint of home investors is rewritten as follows:
bIt ≤ κtNFEt + κtqeHtχHt (19)
The borrowing constraint is thus affected by NFEt but not by ωt. Also foreign investors face a
similar constraint13.
13With equally pledgeable assets, the model might still distinguish between the tightness of home versus foreign
constraints or not. In the first case, (7) implies that the foreign borrowing constraint is
b∗It ≤ κ∗tNFE∗t + κ∗t qeFtχFt
Otherwise, there is no distinction even in the tightness of home versus foreign constraints, and from (8) follows
that
b∗It ≤ κtNFE∗t + κtqeFtχFt
13
In contrast, if the pledgeability of assets is heterogeneous across countries, equation (2) implies
that
bIt ≤ (κHt − κFt)ωt + κFtNFEt + κHtqeHtχHt (20)
The effect of ωt is evident and is proportional to the trade-off between the pledgeability of home
versus foreign equities. And apart from governing bIt , this trade-off generates a link between
budget and collateral constraints. From the above discussion, κHt− κFt has implications for the
return differential across countries, which enters into (18).
5.2 Choice with Homogeneous Pledgeability
Assume that we do not consider the specific pledgeability of home and foreign assets. This case
amounts to the benchmark situation generally considered in Open Economy Models, which can
be analyzed following DS and TvW straightforwardly.
For home investors, the pledgeability of both home and foreign equities is κt. For foreign
investors it is either κ∗t or κt. Respecifying (4)-(5) and their foreign counterparts using κt (and
κ∗t ), one can derive from these equations the following portfolio choice conditions:
Etλ
I
t+1 (rHt+1 − rFt+1) = 0 Etλ∗It+1 (rHt+1 − rFt+1) = 0 (21)
Although the borrowing constraints are binding, investors (at home as well as in the foreign
country) choose their portfolios as in economies with non-binding constraints. Anyone of these
investors can borrow the same amount pledging home and foreign assets. As a result, their
choice between assets depends only on the comovement between stochastic discount factor and
return differential. In the nearly-stochastic steady state, this differential must then be zero and
returns on equities are equalized across countries: r (0) ≡ rH (0) = rF (0). The two countries are
symmetric in all the respects, so the fact that home and foreign assets are equally pledgeable
preserves this symmetry.
A second order approximation of (21) is needed to pin down the steady state portfolio share
ω (0). Combining the approximated relations as suggested by DS, I get
0 = Et
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1)
)
rxt+1 (1) (22)
Etrxt+1 (1) = 0 + T (2) (23)
where rxt (j) ≡ rHt (j) − rFt (j) is the return differential of order j = 0, 1, ... and T (2) contains
second order terms. The derivations, alongside with the definition of T (2), are in the separate
technical appendix.
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Equations (22)-(23) are in line with the benchmark portfolio choice problem. The first is the
portfolio choice condition. It suggests that, to determine the portfolio share ω (0), it is sufficient
to take a standard linearization of the model and interact stochastic discount factors and return
differential at this order of approximation. This can be referred to as the first property of the
recent portfolio solution methods. The second property follows from equation (23). This shows
that, under rational expectations, the predicted return differential associated to ω (0) does not
have first order determinants. So, at the order of approximation which is sufficient to compute
the steady state portfolio share, rxt+1 (1) is a zero-mean shock.
An additional implication is that only the budget constraint is affected by portfolio choice
and, in particular, solely by ω (0). Equation (19) shows that, when home and foreign assets are
equally pledgeable, ωt does not affect the borrowing constraint. These assets must also share the
same long-run rate of return (rx (0) = 0). Consequently, in the approximated model only the
steady state portfolio share, ω (0), affects (18). This occurs through the term rxt (1)ω (0).
5.3 Choice with Heterogeneous Pledgeability
When home and foreign assets have a different degree of pledgeability, equations (4)-(5) and their
foreign counterparts imply the following portfolio choice conditions:
Etλ
I
t+1 (rHt+1 − rFt+1) +Mt (κHt − κFt) = 0 Etλ∗It+1 (rHt+1 − rFt+1) +M∗t (κHt − κFt) = 0
(24)
where I use the definitions Mt ≡ µt/β
(
cIt
)
and M∗t ≡ µ∗t/β
(
c∗It
)
. These variables express the
shadow value of the borrowing constraint of any agent in terms of her rate of time-preference.
Equation (24) shows that, in case of heterogeneous pledgeability, cross-country arbitrage is not
limited to the expected return on assets. The relative pledgeability of home versus foreign
equities, κHt−κFt, matters as well. The effect of this difference in pledgeability depends on how
costly is for an agent to invest under binding borrowing constraints: Mt, for home investors, and
M∗t , for foreign investors.
Any difference between κHt and κFt represents a new determinant of portfolio choice and,
simultaneously, a source of asymmetry between countries. In particular, (24) suggests that the
expected return differential on internationally traded assets may not be zero. There are, at least,
two cases to consider.
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5.3.1 Heterogeneous Pledgeability in the Steady State
If home and foreign assets have different degree of pledgeability already in the nearly-stochastic
steady state, then there is always a return differential between home and foreign equities. From
(24) follows that
rx (0) = − µ (0)
β (cI (0))λI (0)
κx (0) (25)
where the term on the right of the equal sign coincides with EPH (0) − EPF (0) (see equation
(16)) and κx (j) ≡ κH (j) − κF (j) 6= 0 denotes the differential asset pledgeability of order
j = 0, 1, ... The premium on foreign equities is relatively higher if κH (0) > κF (0), and viceversa
if κH (0) < κF (0). Investors need to take into account this heterogeneity between home assets
and foreign assets when choosing their portfolios.
Claim 2 If home and foreign assets are not equally pledgeable in the steady state equilibrium,
the rates of return on home and foreign assets reflect this asymmetry and the properties of the
existing portfolio solution methods are no longer satisfied.
The portfolio choice of investors becomes more complex because the steady state return
differential affects both the dynamics of wealth and their access to credit, through budget and
collateral constraints. The first order approximation of (18) involves the term ω (0) rxt (1) +
rx (0)ωt−1 (1), and the first order approximation of (20) the term ω (0)κxt (1) + κx (0)ωt (1).
That is, ω (0) is not sufficient for investors to understand how their choice between home and
foreign equities will affect their future wealth and their current borrowing. Investors need to
consider also the first order dynamics of their portfolio around ω (0).
Since in absence of shocks the different degree of pledgeability of home versus foreign equities
is non-null but equal to κx (0), a shock to one country has direct effect on the international
portfolio positions of all of the economies. This effect is captured by κx (0)ωt (1), which matters
for the actual tightness of their borrowing constraints. There are dynamic implications also for
the net external wealth accumulated by investors because, according to equation (25), also rx (0)
is different from zero. The impact of the shock on international portfolios enters into the budget
constraints because of rx (0)ωt−1 (1).
On one side, the wealth effect of the steady state return differential, rx (0), must influence
the way investors discount future profits. That is, there is a second order effect on their marginal
utility of future consumption. On the other side, the effect of κx (0) on borrowing must influence
the marginal value of the borrowing constraints that bind in the present period. That is, there
is a second order effect on the shadow cost of leveraging the investment in financial markets.
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These second order effects appear formally in the arbitrage conditions for the selection of
international portfolios. And consequently, a first order approximation of the model is not
sufficient to compute the steady state portfolio share ω (0). The logic behind the methods of DF
and TvW does not apply. The computation needs to be iterative, involving the solution of the
model at different orders of approximation before the full determination of the steady state.
For completeness, I provide the detailed expressions in the external appendix. But note
that this complex computation is not strictly needed for my purpose. Assuming κx (0) 6= 0
is appropriate for analyses targeted to long-run and structural differences between economies,
which I do not pursue here. My focus is instead on short-run dynamics, meaning that the use of
an asset as collateral changes with the prevailing economic conditions.
5.3.2 Short-Run Heterogeneous Pledgeability
In order to capture the effect of economic conditions on pledgeability, let κit be a function of the
deviation of Yit from its steady state, which means that the pledgeability of assets is the same in
the steady state. Indeed, in the present model (as in the majority of the Open Economy Models)
the two countries are symmetric, so they share the same stationary output, Y (0). Formally,
κit = Γ
(
Yit − Y (0) , εiκt
)
, for i = H,F (26)
so that only in the steady state assets have the same pledgeability:
κ (0) ≡ κH (0) = κF (0) (27)
where Γ (·) is increasing in both of the arguments.
This assumption draws from financial studies (e.g., Gorton and Metrick, 2010, and Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009). This literature stresses the fact that, during adverse real and
financial cycles, the pledgeability of some assets decreases because lenders become less willing to
accept them as collateral. The reverse is true of expansions. In general, lenders are concerned for
the value of collateral assets in a given state of the world. Also, the informational asymmetries
between borrowers and lenders tend to vary with the economic conditions (e.g., informed versus
uninformed savers, optimistic versus pessimistic beliefs, etc.).
I do not model these informational frictions, but assume that κit is simply a function of the
output of country i and of an asset-specific shock. The deviations of output from steady state
capture the real determinants that affect the pledgeability of an asset. The asset-specific shock
captures factors attributable to borrowing contracts.
An alternative to output in deviation from steady state, Yit − Y (0), is to assume that the
pledgeability of an asset is a function of its market price (again in deviation from its steady state
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value). But of course, the equity price depends on dividend payouts, which are in turn function
of the business cycle. Furthermore, modeling κit directly as a function of the price of equity i
yields qualitatively similar numerical results for portfolios14.
Claim 3 Under symmetric but state-dependent pledgeability, the expected return differential has
a non-zero first order component. This component is inversely proportional to the different
pledgeability between assets. Accounting for this first order difference, the portfolio choice problem
can still satisfy the main properties of the existing solution methods.
Approximating the conditions in (24) under assumption (26) and combining the resulting
relations as suggested by DS yields
0 = Et
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1)
)
rxt+1 (1) + const× (Mt (1)−M∗t (1))κxt (1) (28)
EtΥxt+1 (1) = 0 + T (2) (29)
where const is a constant term and Υxt+1 (1) is defined as Υt+1 (1) ≡ rxt+1 (1) + const× κxt (1).
From (28) follows that the first property of the portfolio solution methods is satisfied (compare
it with (22)). A first order approximation of the model is sufficient to compute ω (0). To a first
order, investors choose this portfolio share on the basis of two factors. One is the comovement
between the return differential rxt+1 (1) and the future marginal utility of consumption. The
other is the interaction between differences in pledgeability κxt (1) and the shadow cost of the
borrowing constraints. The term const measures the relative weight of these two determinants.
The constant is in fact connected with the loan premium, the pledgeability of equities and the
equity return that prevail in the steady state equilibrium:
const =
µ (0)
β (cI (0))λI (0)
κ (0)
r (0)
Therefore, investors choose between home and foreign assets not only for a return-seeking
motive, but also for being able to borrow from savers. In other words, investors give a relative
value to both rxt+1 (1) and κxt (1). The weighted combination of these two variables, Υxt+1 (1),
expresses the overall differential performance of home equities versus foreign equities. Up to
a first order, this overall differential has expected value equal to zero. This result comes from
14That is, in one robustness check I use the price of equity in the place of aggregate output as the main driver of
pledgeability. This is a test on the reliability of the numerical results that are discussed in section 6. Qualitatively,
I do not find differences between alternative specifications. See the external appendix for further details. See
Trani (2012) for an attempt to model the loan-to-value ratio as a function of the price of internationally traded
equity.
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equation (29), and imply that also the second property of the portfolio solution methods is
satisfied (compare it with (23)). But notice that, since equities do not have the same pledgeability
outside the steady state, the expected return differential per se is no longer equal to zero:
Etrxt+1 (1) = EtΥxt+1 (1)− const× κxt (1) (30)
where −const× κxt (1) represents the non-zero mean return differential.
Since the portfolio choice condition (28) can be solved with the first order behaviour of model
variables, the evolution of wealth and current borrowing are influenced only by the steady state
portfolio share ω (0). In the stationary equilibrium, home and foreign equities display the same
κ (0) and there is no return differential. The return on equities is unique and equal to r (0) and,
given equation (16), the equity premium is unique as well15. Therefore, a linear approximation
of the budget constraint (18) only involves the steady state portfolio share through the term
rxt (1)ω (0). This is the same feature of models with equally pledgeable collateral (or with no
credit constraints at all). But, according to Claim 1, now portfolio choice does not only affect the
flow-of-funds, but also the collateral constraints. When one country is hit by a shock, assets cease
to be equally pledgeable. And, following the same reasoning adopted for the budget constraint,
only the zero order portfolio matters. Given (20), this effect is captured by κx (1)ω (0).
To sum up, conditions (28)-(29) recast the portfolio solution for the case of heterogeneously
pledgeable assets in terms of the existing methods: DS and TvW. The heterogeneous pledgeabil-
ity of assets is contingent on economic innovations, and the current approach has two specific
characteristics. First, the optimal portfolio does not only depend on the expected return on
assets, but also on how these assets are useful as guarantee for loans. Second, the model must be
solved specifying the new variable Υxt (1), because international arbitrage aims at eliminating
expected return differentials and differentials in pledgeability taken together.
5.4 Credit Spreads and Solution for Portfolios
Since investors choose the allocation of their portfolio on the basis of the overall differential
Υxt (1), (28) can be transformed to make this variable explicit as follows
0 = Et
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1)
)
Υxt+1 (1)
+const× [(Mt (1)−M∗t (1))− Et (λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1))]κxt (1)
where the term in square brackets amounts to the first order approximate behaviour of the risk
premium paid by home and foreign investors on their debt (µt/
[
β
(
cIt
)
Etλ
I
t+1
]
, µ∗t/
[
β
(
c∗It
)
Etλ
∗I
t+1
]
).
15The risk premium common to all equities in the steady state is EP (0) = −µ (0)κ (0) / [β (cI (0))λI (0)].
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As argued by Dedola and Lombardo (2012), financial integration tends to equalize credit spreads
across home and foreign countries. Ultimately, this simplifies the solution for portfolios.
Lemma 4 In a world with financially integrated capital and debt markets, risk premiums are
equalized up to a first order:
Mt (1)− EtλIt+1 (1) = M∗t (1)− Etλ∗It+1 (1)
Therefore, the portfolio choice condition to solve is
0 = Et
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1)
)
Υxt+1 (1) (31)
Proof. See appendix A (in the back of the text).
Equation (31) is the condition to apply, once the first order solution of the model is available.
This result relies on the forces of arbitrage under financial integration: home and foreign credit
spreads are equal up to first order. This is particularly straightforward in the model under
analysis, as bonds are sold in a world market. However, this simplification is not so restrictive,
as debt markets have recently shown to be highly integrated. Moreover, Dedola and Lombardo
(2012) show that financial integration in one market (the one for capital) is itself sufficient to
generate a tendency toward the equalization of risk premiums on loans across countries. So
alternative models can be amended in this sense.
In the numerical exercise that follows, I apply (31) using an iterative procedure and solve for
a fixed point. This solution is useful because, to interpret the numerical results, I introduce a
second order transaction cost as the one proposed by TvW. This cost affects the cross-border
returns on equities and, thus, it can generate the home equity bias observed in the data. Clearly,
(31) is similar to the condition derived by DS. So, apart from the transaction cost τ , also their
recursive approach could be taken as reference. The details of my computation are in appendix
B (in the back of the text).
6 Numerical Application
6.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model taking parameters from earlier studies on the international transmission
of shocks under borrowing constraints (Devereux and Yetman, 2010, and Trani, 2012). My
calibration is reported in Table 2. The population is equally divided between savers and investors,
as the number of investors is n = 0.5. The endogenous discount factor of is β (c) = ζ (1 + c)−φ
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for any individual in the population. The momentary utility function of each agent is CRRA,
u (c) = c1−σ/ (1− σ), with σ = 2. The production function of firms is a standard Cobb-Douglas,
Y = AKα, and the capital share is α = 0.4.
The net risk-free rate on loans is set to 4.2 percent per annum, which is close to the average
annualized LIBOR in the U.K. and the U.S in recent data16. Leveraged investors also pay a
premium as a result of the need to pledge collateral. The loan premium, M (0) /λI (0) 17, is
for simplicity equal to 100 basis points. The pledgeability of an asset in the steady state is
κ (0) = 0.518.
The forcing variables of the system, productivity and shocks to pledgeability, are standard
autoregressive processes:
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εAt
lnκit = ρκ lnκit−1 + (1− ρκ) [lnκ (0) + ηY ln (Yit/Y (0))] + εκit, for i = H,F (32)
lnκt = (1− ρκ) lnκ (0) + ρκ lnκt−1 + εκt (33)
where ηY denotes the elasticity of κit to the fluctuations of GDP around its steady state. Equation
(32) applies to the case of assets that have different degree of pledgeability. The pledgeability of
home and foreign equities follow the business cycle of the corresponding economy and is subject
to an exogenous shock. Equation (33) applies to the case of homogeneously pledgeable assets,
which is used as a benchmark for comparisons. The literature so far has in fact relied on this
assumption.
The parameters used for these shocks are in the bottom part of Table 2. Numerical portfolios
are generally affected by such factors as the persistence of shocks and the correlation between
shocks. I choose the value of these types of parameters in order to minimize their influence on
the results.
The persistence of productivity shocks is ρA = 0.82, which is close to the average Solow
Residual that can be computed from a sample of major OECD countries19. I set the persistence
of financial shocks to the same level as ρA. In fact, according to the estimation of Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), the persistence of financial shocks is rather high and close to ρA. In addition,
their estimates show that financial shocks are more volatile than productivity shocks, so I also
set σA < σκ. Nonetheless, I opt for a very small difference between the two volatilities.
To eliminate the effect of a possible comovement between shocks, I assume that shocks are
16See Trani (2012).
17M (0) /λI (0) = µ (0) /
[
β
(
cI (0)
)
λI (0)
]
18See Devereux and Yetman (2010).
19See Trani (2012).
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uncorrelated. Particularly important is the fact that shocks of the same nature are uncorrelated
across countries. Setting these correlation to zero is appealing here because the goal is analytic
and illustrative. Specifically, the goal is to see how the heterogeneous pledgeability between home
and foreign assets affect the diversification of international portfolios.
Finally, financial shocks are calibrated, regardless of whether they affect a specific asset
(equation (32)) or all the assets of the investors of a given country (equation (33)). However,
in the first of these alternatives, the asset-specific pledgeability is affected by the fluctuations of
output. I set the elasticity ηY to 0.7, and I use two lower values (0.3 and 0) for robustness.
6.2 Equilibrium Portfolios
Table 3 reports the holdings of fixed capital of all the agents in the two countries. The capital
holdings of savers are restricted to the domestic capital stock and depend on the allocation of this
capital between the two productive sectors of each economy. The capital holdings of investors
are instead diversified across borders. The optimal diversification gives rise to the equilibrium
portfolio shares, the shares that satisfy the steady state of the world economy.
A stylized fact is that country portfolios (especially, the equity portfolios) are biased toward
the domestic assets. I take the assumption of homogeneous pledgeability across assets as bench-
mark, and I calibrate the transaction cost τ so as to obtain home bias for this version of the
model. This is an appropriate benchmark because it amounts to the assumption commonly made
in recent studies and because it can be solved directly with the methods developed by DS and
TvW. For illustration purposes, I choose a bias toward local assets equal to 65% of the overall
portfolio. See the results in columns two and three of Table 3 (the bold character is used to
denote that this is the benchmark case).
Introducing a different degree of pledgeability between assets, domestic equities become less
appealing to investors. Under the same transaction cost τ , the share of domestic equities in
country portfolios drops from 65% to 61.2%. This result is shown in columns four and five.
What is the explanation for this result? If home and foreign equities have the same pledge-
ability, only the return differential between these two assets matter. An investor considers the
expected return of home and foreign equities in each possible future state, evaluating these re-
turns on the basis of the marginal utility of consumption in that state. But she does not need
to compare home and foreign assets for any other reasons. There is no possibility to reduce the
tightness of the borrowing constraint investing more heavily in the domestic market or in the
foreign market. Ultimately, an investor allocates her wealth as if she was not subject to any
credit constraints. Of course, this ceases to be true when there is a marginal opportunity to
22
relax a bit the borrowing constraint by investing more in assets that are better pledgeable.
More precisely, the relative pledgeability of home versus foreign equities depends on the state
of the home country and of the foreign country, respectively. The decrease in home bias from
65% to 61.2% is thus a signal of the fact that investors want to be less exposed to equities whose
pledgeability fluctuates with the domestic economic cycle. When there is a recession in a country,
the residents of that country are forced to cut back their consumption and their borrowing. Also
the pledgeability of that country assets will be lower, as lenders shall be more suspicious about
the collateral properties of those assets. Ceteris paribus, the needed reduction in consumption
and in borrowing is greater, the higher the exposure to stocks issued by the domestic firms.
Note that the fluctuations of output bring about a slight reduction in home bias only if the
pledgeability is asset-specific. Consider again the case in which the pledgeability is different for
investors of different countries but homogeneous among the assets in any investors’ portfolio.
Let κt and κ
∗
t follow the same process as the one used to model asset-specific pledgeability (see
equation (32)): κt is function of home country output; κ
∗
t is function of foreign country output.
Strikingly, in this case the tendency to invest more in the domestic firms as opposed to foreign
firms increases to 67.6% (see the last two columns of Table 3).
Robustness. The reduction in home bias caused by the fact that assets have different degree
of pledgeability across countries is clearly affected by ηY . But qualitatively the decrease in home
bias is found for various parameter values.
For ηY = 0.7, home equity bias drops from 65% to 61.2%. As one would expect, lowering
ηY leads to a smaller reduction in home bias. I check with two alternative values: ηY = 0.3
and ηY = 0. The results are reported in Table 4. As expected, the reduction in home bias is
smaller for this alternative calibration. For a given shock to output, the specific pledgeability
of assets fluctuates less than before. The effect on the tightness of the borrowing constraint is
correspondingly smaller.
Yet, a tiny reduction in home bias remains even if the pledgeability of home and foreign
equities is purely exogenous (ηY = 0). In this case, agents invest in local assets 0.2% less than
in the benchmark case of homogeneous asset pledgeability. Although this is a tiny difference,
note that borrowing constraints leave the international portfolios indeterminate if assets have
the same degree of pledgeability (Devereux and Sutherland, 2011b). On the other hand, the tiny
decrease in home bias means that investors still care for the risk posed by the heterogeneous asset
pledgeability. What matters is that idiosyncratic financial shocks create a wedge between the
assets in their portfolios. This wedge has important dynamic effects that are discussed below.
Finally, the bottom part of Table 4 shows how high the transaction cost τ should be to have
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65% home bias also in the heterogeneous pledgeability case. For the results discussed up to now,
the cost is τ = 2.757e−5. For any ηY , the cost τ that is consistent with 65% home bias under
heterogeneous pledgeability is higher than the benchmark value of 2.757e−5.
6.3 Dynamic Effects of Shocks
Given the steady state portfolios, one can trace the global effects of shocks in any country. The
shocks I consider are unitary declines in home country productivity and in the pledgeability of
home equities. Comparisons with the case of homogeneously pledgeable assets are also drawn.
Figure 2 gives a summary of the international deleveraging that these shocks generate. A
shock in the home country reduces the price of home equities and, simultaneously, exacerbates the
credit frictions. Borrowing constraints tighten in all countries because all investors are exposed
to home equities, under financial integration. The credit spreads on loans increase for all of
the investors, while the world interest rate declines because of the contraction in borrowing.
The decline in borrowing leads to deleveraging of capital. Since portfolios are internationally
diversified, agents need to disinvest both home and foreign capital. The shock gets transmitted,
in the way described by Devereux and Yetman (2010). There is also an arbitrage effect on prices
and loan premiums due to financial integration, as indicated by Dedola and Lombardo (2012).
In one word, the model with heterogeneous pledgeability has similar implications as those found
in the literature.
Furthermore, productivity and financial shocks have qualitatively similar effects on the world
economy, although the consequences of a fall in home country productivity are quantitatively
more relevant. Yet, the synchronization between countries is stronger under financial shocks.
Perri and Quadrini (2012) put emphasis on this synchronization and build a theory to capture
it. Here, the strong comovement is reflected in the dynamics of the trade balance. Under
productivity shocks, the country hit by the shock (in this case, the home country) reduces
its consumption more strongly than the other country. Yet, home country output decreases
even more and the economy displays a trade balance deficit. In the case of financial shocks,
consumption and output comove almost exactly in all countries. So the trade balance of the
home country remains flat.
6.3.1 Financial Shocks
A different degree in the pledgeability of traded assets have implications for the mechanism un-
derlying the financial shocks and, thus, for their interpretation. Given the numerical portfolios
predicted by the model, these financial shocks modify the trade-off between home and foreign eq-
24
uities. Investors take into account how the pledgeability of each asset contributes to the tightness
of their borrowing constraints. After a financial shock to home equities, their pledgeability falls:
their usefulness as collateral assets decreases until the shock continues to produce its effects. The
shock reduces consumption as well, so that investors will have a high marginal utility of income
in the next periods. Equity premiums must increase, but investors require an higher premium on
home assets than on foreign assets for the periods to come. Figure 3 shows that the differential
premium, EPH −EPF , effectively goes up. Due to arbitrage, EPH −EPF increases in the same
way for both home country investors and foreign country investors, yet the ultimate profit of
each investor depends on her initial portfolio position.
A different mechanism is instead at work when assets have the same degree of pledgeability.
The response functions concerning this case are highlighted with a marker (a convention that is
adopted below as well) and show that now financial shocks do not affect the variable EPH−EPF .
More specifically, when there is no difference in the pledgeability of assets, a financial shock at
home does not affect the overall performance of home equities versus foreign equities. In this
case, the relative performance between the two asset is simply the return differential rx, which
does not react to the financial shock. When instead assets do not have the same degree of
pledgeability, the relative performance between them is the overall differential Υx. This captures
both the return on assets and their suitability as collateral. Figure 3 shows that Υx do indeed
react to a financial shock to home equities. It falls on impact and then goes back to long-run
equilibrium. However, the initial fall in Υx is due to a fall in the differential pledgeability of home
versus foreign equities, κx, so the return differential rx needs to be above its steady state level in
the periods after the shock. This increase in rx confirms agents expectations about the relative
premium on home versus foreign equities: indeed, differently from rx
20, EPH − EPF reacts on
impact to the shock.
This reaction in the return differential leads to a small but positive valuation effect for the
home country, while the balance on income is basically unaffected. Also this result is reported
in Figure 3, which further shows that a model with homogeneously pledgeable assets has exactly
the opposite predictions. In the latter case, valuation effects are zero, while there is a decrease
in the home country balance on income. This result shows that the international transmission of
financial shocks is different whether assets have the same pledgeability or not. And to show this,
a more precise definition of valuation effects and an analysis of how borrowing reacts to financial
shocks is needed.
First, valuation effects and balance on income are defined following Devereux and Sutherland
20Note that, on impact, rx declines in the same way as Υx and then overshoots above the steady state level.
The decline on impact is not reported in the graph just for convenience.
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(2010). From the dynamic equation for net foreign equities (the budget constraint (18)), one can
get a more compact definition of the net foreign assets for all the agents in the home country.
That is, combining (18) with (9) and (12), one can write down the following expression:
NFEt −
(
bIt +
1− n
n
bSt
)
= TBt + rxtωt−1 + rFtNFEt−1 −Rt−1
(
bIt−1 +
1− n
n
bSt−1
)
(34)
where TBt = YHt − ct21. This expression shows that the total net foreign assets of the economy
(the term on the right side of the equal sign) is affected by international debt flows. Since the
bond market is unique (equation (12)), the home country becomes a net borrower if on a given
date bIt + (1− n) bSt /n > 0. This means that, at time t, the leveraged residents of the home
country want to borrow more than what the domestic savers can provide. This excess demand
is satisfied by the foreign country22. The reverse is true if bIt + (1− n) bSt /n < 0. And finally,
up to a first order the definition of valuation effects and balance on income23 is, respectively, as
follows
V Et (1) = ω˜
I (0) rxt (1) (35)
BIt (1) = (r (0)− 1)NFEt−1 (1)− (R (0)− 1) b
I (0)
cI (0)
(
bIt−1 (1)− bSt−1 (1)
)
(36)
where NFEt−1 (1) = NFEt−1/cI (0) and ω˜I (0) = ω (0) r (0) /cI (0).
Equation (35) makes it clear why financial shocks have valuation effects only when assets
have different degree of pledgeability. Only in this case, rx falls on impact (before increasing
in line with the differential equity premium). Since ex ante the home country owns 65% of the
home capital stock and the rest is diversified, ω˜I (0) < 0 and, thus, V Et (1) must be positive at
the time of the shock. In the opposite case of equal asset pledgeability, financial shocks do not
affect the return differential rx; what matters is instead the way financial shocks affect borrowing
by investors. As Figure 4 shows, the demand for credit reacts differently depending on whether
assets have the same pledgeability or not. If assets have the same pledgeability, the financial
shock is a shock to κt. Lenders are not willing to supply funds only to home country investors,
regardless of the quality of the assets in their portfolio. Investors in the foreign country can
21Because of perfect competition, the aggregate output of goods produced by home country firms satisfies
YHt = [1 + (1− n) /n]wt + dHtχHt−1. ct = ncIt + (1− n)
[
cSt − z
(
kSHt−1
)ν]
is the amount of home production
consumed by local agents.
22In the foreign country, b∗It + (1− n) b∗St /n < 0.
23See Devereux and Sutherland (2010). Here I use two of their key findings. On one side, they show that
rx (1) is basically solely affected by movements in prices. On the other hand, the behaviour of NFE (1) for given
r (0)− 1 depends mostly on dividends, which matter for the balance on income.
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continue to borrow, as their access to credit remains basically unaffected. Importantly, foreign
investors can continue to borrow not only from foreign savers but also from savers in the home
country. There are two consequences. One is that the credit available in the world economy
stops to flow to the home country and goes to the foreign country. The second is that, loosing
access to external funds, only home country investors need to deleverage their foreign equities in
net terms (i.e., NFEt).
So in few words, if assets have the same pledgeability only borrowing in the home country
is affected by the financial shocks. If instead assets have different degree of pledgeability, then
the financial shock affects investors in all of the countries. In particular, all of the investors face
tighter credit constraints, and borrowing falls both at home and in the foreign country. The
reduction in borrowing is proportional to the initial exposure to home assets. As Figure 4 shows,
the home equity bias of 65% implies that borrowing decreases by more in the home country. So
there is still a debt outflow from the home country to the foreign country, but it is smaller than
that observed in the case of homogeneously pledgeable assets. The reduction in the net foreign
assets of the home country is correspondingly smaller.
The interpretation and effects of financial shocks change in accordance with the type of finan-
cial shock. If home and foreign assets have the same degree of pledgeability, a negative financial
shock in the home country is a decrease in the ability of residents there to obtain funds from
savers, for any given level of wealth. The shock is transmitted because home country investors
have cross-border positions (through loss of access to credit market loans and deleveraging). Yet,
there are no relative price effects across borders, and foreign investors continue to borrow. On
the other hand, if home and foreign equities have different degree of pledgeability, the negative
financial shock at home affects the assets issued by local firms. Because of financial integration
in capital markets, these assets are in the portfolios of investors both in the home country and in
the foreign country. And this constitutes an additional channel for the international transmission
of shocks, producing valuation effects.
Robustness. The results on the consequences of financial shocks are rather robust both qual-
itatively and quantitatively. While the implications for portfolio choice change quantitatively
with ηY , the effects of shocks to the pledgeability of home equities are similar for various values
of ηY . Even for ηY = 0 the impact of a financial shocks on expected return differential, valuation
effects and international transmission are almost identical to those in Figures 3-4. This test can
be found in the external appendix.
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6.3.2 Productivity Shocks
Also the effects of productivity shocks depend on whether assets have different pledgeability.
But given the structure of the model, the main consequences are produced by the fall in home
country productivity itself. Consider the responses reported in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
The productivity shock has a negative impact effect on the return differential rx. But this
negative effect originates from the fact that, after the shock, home country firms pay lower
dividends. This is true in any case, regardless of the pledgeability of assets. And, in both of the
cases, the relative reduction in dividends and prices of home capital has direct valuation effects.
These effects are large.
The possibility that assets have different degree of pledgeability influences the return dif-
ferential. In this case, the pledgeability of home equities worsens together with the shock to
productivity, while that of foreign equities depends on the foreign business cycle. The home
country is the economy most affected by the shock, even if the shock gets transmitted to the
foreign country. So the pledgeability of home equities falls relatively more than that of foreign
equities, causing a relative increase of the equity premium on the former assets relative to the
latter. Yet, the reaction of EPH − EPF is smaller than under financial shocks.
Similarly, the shock already generates positive valuation effects for the home country, as the
fall in productivity causes rx to decrease. Equity premiums contribute to these valuation effects,
but it is not the case that valuation effects are absent without differences in pledgeability. This
was instead the case of financial shocks. As Figure 6 shows, another difference with the previous
case is that the net foreign assets of the home country improves on impact. This is because the
valuation effects are very strong for productivity shocks, while flows (especially debt flows) are
most important under financial shocks.
Robustness. While the effects of financial shocks are robust to the choice of ηY > 0, real shocks
generate the dynamics just described only if ηY > 0. In some sense, this is a by-product of the
model at hand. Recall that, in the model under analysis, differences in pledgeability are short-
term and that productivity and financial shocks are assumed to be completely uncorrelated for
analytic convenience. These robustness tests are not reported for brevity.
7 Conclusion
Although the demand for an asset is principally explained by the flow of income it can generate,
this paper shows that other factors can be important as well. The additional factor studied is the
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pledgeability of an asset as collateral for borrowing in the credit market. This captures the idea
that lenders prefer to receive certain collateral assets as guarantee for their loans. In the model,
the specific pledgeability of each asset is introduced in the borrowing constraints of leveraged
investors.
I use borrowing constraints of this type in a two-country model recently developed for analyz-
ing the international transmission of shocks. The model involves an endogenous portfolio choice,
which is not straightforward to solve once the assumption that assets have the same pledgeability
is relaxed. I propose a solution strategy that is based on both the effect of heterogeneous pledge-
ability on cross-border return differentials and the equalization of credit spreads under financial
integration.
My numerical application shows that borrowing constraints matter for optimal portfolio
choice. This is not true for the case of homogeneously pledgeable assets. Also the interpretation
and effects of financial shocks are different. In fact, the shocks to the pledgeability of a single
asset that is traded on international markets is naturally transmitted because of international
diversification of asset holdings. This result seems to be quite relevant for the current structure of
financial markets. Financial integration heightened in the last decades, and some internationally
traded assets deemed to be a good collateral can suddenly loose their pledgeability.
How the approach developed here can be adopted to consider assets that are inherently safe
(and the question of global imbalances) within international portfolio models is left for the future.
Here I pointed out some technical issues, but further research is needed.
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A Proof Of Lemma 4
Under financial integration, loan premiums are equalized across countries up to first order. To see
this, consider the optimality conditions for bonds and equities. Since focusing on just one equity
is sufficient, consider equations (3)-(4). These express the demand for credit and the demand for
home equity by home country investors. Similar conditions apply for foreign investors.
Since in equilibrium the marginal utility of borrowing and purchasing equities must be equal
for all of the investors in the market, these conditions can be combined as follows:
Rt+1Etλ
I
t+1 +Mt = Etλ
I
t+1rHt+1 +MtκHt
Rt+1Etλ
∗I
t+1 +M
∗
t = Etλ
∗I
t+1rHt+1 +M
∗
t κHt
Approximating these relations to a first order yields the following expressions:[
λI (0)R (0)
(
Rt+1 (1) + Etλ
I
t+1 (1)
)
+M (0)Mt (1)
]
=
[
r (0)λI (0)Et
(
λIt+1 (1) + rHt+1 (1)
)
+κ (0)M (0) (Mt (1) + κHt (1))
]
(37)[
λI (0)R (0)
(
Rt+1 (1) + Etλ
∗I
t+1 (1)
)
+M (0)M∗t (1)
]
=
[
r (0)λI (0)Et
(
λ∗It+1 (1) + rHt+1 (1)
)
+κ (0)M (0) (M∗t (1) + κHt (1))
]
(38)
Since capital markets are integrated, every investor has a share of home equities in her portfolio.
In addition, debt is issued in the international bond market. So (37)-(38) can be further combined
in order to obtain a relationship between shadow cost of constrained borrowing and marginal
utility of future consumption:
(1− κ (0)) M (0)
λI (0)
(Mt (1)−M∗t (1)) = (r (0)−R (0))Et
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1)
)
(39)
Now recall that the loan premiums (or credit spreads) are given by
µt
β (cIt )Etλ
I
t+1
=
Mt
EtλIt+1
µ∗t
β (c∗It )Etλ∗It+1
=
M∗t
Etλ∗It+1
Therefore, equation (39) implies the equalization of the first order approximation of these loan
premiums for suitable values of the constants of approximation, (1− κ (0))M (0) /λI (0) and
(r (0)−R (0)).
Note that, from conditions (3)-(5) and (10), the steady state return on equities is
r (0) =
1
β (cI (0))
(
1− µ (0)
λI (0)
κ¯
)
and the premium on equities is
r (0)−R (0) = β
(
cS (0)
)− β (cI (0))
β (cS (0)) β (cI (0))
− µ (0)
β (cI (0))λI (0)
κ (0)
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where µ (0) /
[
β
(
cI (0)
)
λI (0)
]
=
(
β
(
cS (0)
)− β (cI (0))) / [β (cI (0)) β (cS (0))] > 0. Finally,
use this result with (39) and get(
Mt (1)− EtλIt+1 (1)
)
=
(
M∗t (1)− Etλ∗It+1 (1)
)
(40)
which indeed proves that the loan premium paid by home and foreign investors is the same up
to first order.
A.1 An Interpretation of Υx Based on Lemma 4
The proof of Lemma 4 allows for a further interpretation of Υx, defined in the text as the overall
differential performance of home versus foreign equities.
Equation (28) is the relevant portfolio choice condition. This condition implies that the
expected overall differential is a sort of risk premium:
EtΥxt+1 (1) = −
covt
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1) ,Υxt+1 (1)
)
Et
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1)
) (41)
That is, the expected overall differential depends on how the expected marginal utility of con-
sumption of home agents relative to that of foreign agents comove with Υx. Indeed, the future
marginal utility of income of any agent is affected by actual differences in asset pledgeability and
by future return differentials, which are both captured by Υx. The expected value of this overall
differential is a first order term, as it is the ratio of a second order term and a first order term.
However, the numerator must be zero when the model is solved up to a first order.
Condition (29) shows that this is effectively the case. Up to first order,
EtΥxt+1 (1) = 0 (42)
and, thus, the right hand side of (41) is equal to zero. Since Υxt+1 = rxt+1 + const × κxt, this
result confirms that the expected return differential is non-zero up to first order:
Etrxt+1 (1) = EtΥxt+1 (1)− const× κxt (1) (43)
which is equivalent to (30) in the text.
B Iterative Solution for Portfolios
The solution for the first order component of model variables is
st+1 (1) = Π1xt (1) + Π2st (1) (44)
ct (1) = Φ1xt (1) + Φ2st (1) (45)
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where st+1 are the endogenous states, ct are the jump variables, xt are the exogenous states and,
finally, Π1,Π2,Φ1,Φ2 are matrices of numbers.
As mentioned in the text, I use an “iceberg cost” τ on financial transactions to reproduce an
home equity bias similar to that observed in the data. This cost is second order, so the specific
condition that I apply to determine ω (0) is actually
0 = 2τ + Et
(
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1)
)
Υxt+1 (1) (46)
The derivation of this condition is detailed in the external appendix.
In terms of procedure, (46) is applied as follows. Once the solution (44)-(45) of the model is
available, it is possible to extract from this solution the following rows:
Υt+1 (1) = Uεt+1
λIt+1 (1)− λ∗It+1 (1) = L1εt+1 + L2
(
xt (1)
st+1 (1)
)
where εt+1 = (εAt+1 εA∗t+1 εκH t+1 εκF t+1)
′ is the 4× 1 vector of shocks. Using these lines with
(46), it is possible to define the following implicit function:
g (ω (0)) ≡ 2τ + UΣL′1 (47)
where Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of economic innovations.
So, starting with an initial value ω0 (0), the optimal portfolio is the solution for which
g (ω (0)) = 0. Given the way the portfolio share is defined, there is home bias in asset hold-
ings only if ω (0) < 0. So, formally, the solution for the optimal portfolio is
ω? (0) = arg min
ω(0)∈S
|g (ω (0))− 0| (48)
where S is a neighbourhood of values around zero:
S = {ω (0) : ω (0) ∈ [−δ; δ]}
A possible iteration is as follows: (a) choose ω0 (0); (b) solve for the first order component of
model variables; (c) extract the rows which are appropriate to compute (47) and apply it; (d)
repeat steps (a)-(c) until (48) is satisfied with a certain degree of approximation. Note that the
ultimate solution is conditional on a given τ .
I use a similar approach also for computing the optimal portfolio when assets have equal
pledgeability. In this case, the solution methods already existing in the literature apply. The
portfolio choice condition to solve is (22) and the rows of the model solution to extract are
indicated by DS.
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Homogeneous Between Assets Heterogeneous Between Assets
Home Investors κt κHt 6= κFt
Foreign Investors κt or κ
∗
t 6= κt κHt 6= κFt
Table 1: Alternative Assumptions on Pledgeability
parameter description value
n number of constrained investors 0.5
φ discount factor parameter 0.022
σ CRRA 2
α capital share in income 0.4
z fixed productivity in backyard production 1
ν degree of homogeneity in backyard sector 0.1
R (0) gross rate of interest 1.042
M (0) /λI (0) guarantee premium 0.01
A (0) total factor productivity 1
ρA persistence of productivity shocks 0.82
σA volatility of productivity shocks 0.015
κ (0) debt-to-asset ratio 0.5
ηY sensitivity of debt-to-asset ratio to output gap 0.7(baseline), 0.3, 0
ρκ persistence of financial shocks 0.82
σκ, σκi volatility of financial shocks 0.02
Table 2: Calibration
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Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homo. dependent on GDP
H equity F equity H equity F equity H equity F equity
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
H Country Savers 0.792 - 0.792 - 0.792 -
H Country Investors 2.060 1.109 1.941 1.229 2.144 1.026
F Country Savers - 0.792 - 0.792 - 0.792
F Country Investors 1.109 2.060 1.229 1.941 1.026 2.144
H Country Portfolio 65% 35% 61.2% 38.8 % 67.6% 32.4%
F Country Portfolio 35% 65% 38.8% 61.2% 32.4% 67.6%
Table 3: Portfolios under Alternative Cases of Asset Pledgeability
Note: The percentage of stocks issued by local firms in the total country portfolio depends on investors’ holdings of
home and foreign equities. The computation is straightforward: Holdings of local investors/(Holdings of local and
foreign investors). This portfolios have been obtained with the transaction cost τ = 2.757e−5. This cost reproduces an
home bias of 65% in a model with assets that have homogeneous pledgeability (i.e., the benchmark for comparisons).
The elasticity to output assumes its baseline value (ηY = 0.7). Finally, the last two columns show the case in which
agent-specific pledgeability is modeled in the same way as the asset-specific pledgeability. That is, lnκt = ρκ lnκt−1 +
(1− ρκ) [lnκ (0) + ηY ln (YHt/Y (0))] + εκ,t and lnκ∗t = ρκ lnκ∗t−1 + (1− ρκ) [lnκ (0) + ηY ln (YFt/Y (0))] + εκ∗,t.
Varying the level of ηY
ηY = 0.7 (baseline) ηY = 0.3 ηY = 0
Portfolio Share of Local Assets 61.2% 63.2 % 64.8 %
Portfolio Share of External Assets 38.8% 36.8 % 35.2 %
τ needed for 65% Home Bias 2.906e−5 2.824e−5 2.764e−5
Table 4: Portfolios Robustness
Note: The computation reported in the table use a transaction cost τ = 2.757e−5, as in Table 3. The only exception is
the last row.
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Figure 1: The International Investment Position of the U.S.
Source: International Investment Position, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Figure 2: Summary Effects of Productivity and Financial Shocks
Note: The real shock is a unit, negative innovation to home country productivity. The financial shock is a unit, negative
innovation to the pledgeability of home equity.
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Figure 3: Effects of Financial Shocks on Asset Returns
Note: The first diagram shows the reaction of rx only for the periods following the shock. On impact instead rx falls,
which is suggested by the fourth diagram. The differential between home equity premium and foreign equity premium
is given by EPH − EPF and reported in the diagram labeled “H versus F Equity Premiums” of the Figure.
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Figure 4: Effects of Financial Shocks on Borrowing and External Assets
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Figure 5: Effects of Productivity Shocks on Asset Returns
Note: The first diagram shows the reaction of rx only for the periods following the shock. On impact instead rx falls,
which is suggested by the fourth diagram. The differential between home equity premium and foreign equity premium
is given by EPH − EPF and reported in the diagram labeled “H versus F Equity Premiums” of the Figure.
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Figure 6: Effects of Productivity Shocks on Borrowing and External Assets
40
